No fiction writer could dream up a character like Adolf Hitler and then  credibly ask a reader to believe that this strange character could ever  possibly become Chancellor of Germany. 
Hitler was a nobody until  he was thirty years old. A man without much formal education who had  served as a corporal in the First World War. A man given to ranting on  about his enthusiasms and who spun conspiracy theories at every turn. A  weirdo. 	
It was historical circumstance – at least as much as  individual character – that made the Hitler we know from history.  Because when Hitler washed up in Munich in 1919 he found, for the first  time in his life, a Cause. Having gained a sense of belonging in the  trenches of the First World War, he now experienced the trauma of defeat  and – almost as bad – the sight of Communist revolutionaries attempting  to take over the government of Bavaria.  	
Almost immediately  Hitler conceived a dream – that he would be instrumental in destroying  the hated legacy of defeat. And he wasn’t alone in his desire to pursue  this dream. ‘At the end of the First World War Germany is left  a very  aggrieved country,’ says Professor Sir Ian Kershaw. ‘It seems as if it’s  an undefeated nation, undefeated in the field. The claims are in  Germany that they’ve been – by the radical right, not just by Hitler and  so on, but by the radical right – there’s been a stab in the back, that  the fighting front was stabbed in the back by unrest at home, so they  hadn’t really been defeated. Then comes the Versailles Treaty and they  have territory which is taken away from them and so on. So this is like a  running sore throughout the 1920s and the 1930s.’ 
The core  components of Hitler’s world view were formed early on and did not  alter. He believed that Germany had been betrayed in the war – largely  by Jews who had plotted behind the lines to ensure Germany’s defeat  (this was nonsense, of course) but also by the terms of the Versailles  treaty which imposed punitive reparations on Germany and by which the  Germans had to give up significant amounts of territory. 	Hitler’s  appeal in those early years after the First World War rested in part on  his personality and his ability to make powerful speeches, but largely  on the fact that he was saying things that a significant number of  Germans also passionately believed. 
Herman Goering, for example,  joined the Nazi party in the early 1920s because Hitler’s views chimed  exactly with his own.  	But still, large numbers of Germans disagreed  with Hitler, and in 1928 - after a failed attempt at a Putsch in 1923, a  period of imprisonment and several years of trying to hold the party  together - the Nazis gained less than 3% in the general election. The  Nazis looked to be a bunch of fanatics on the way to nowhere. 
Yet  less than five years later – on 30 January 1933, Hitler was Chancellor  of Germany. And it was circumstance that primarily catapulted the Nazis  to power. The depression in the wake of the Wall Street Crash of 1929  led to horrific economic and social suffering in Germany. As a result,  many people turned against the fledgling German democracy and longed for  a ‘strong man’. But still, it took a collection of influential people  like Franz von Papen, the former Chancellor, to convince President  Hindenburg to give Hitler a chance. Von Papen, in one of the most  gigantic misjudgments in history, thought that Hitler could be  controlled once in power. 
Once in power, Hitler had one  overwhelming economic priority – rearmament. Under his leadership  Germany entered a period of sustained rearmament on a level never before  seen in a country ostensibly still at peace. 
‘The scale by 1936  is already extraordinary,’ says the economic historian, Professor Adam  Tooze. ‘In the summer of 1936 the German army manages to gang up with  Goering and force an armaments programme from the army that was  essentially unsustainable, so the level of spending by 1939 posed the  question, according to one armament's expert, of whether Germany would  slow down the armaments programme, bring it to a halt, or go to war. In  other words, we would have so much armament in the army that we would be  faced with the question of whether or not to use it. You couldn’t  maintain it in being. So from 1936 onwards they’re already moving  towards a state of fundamental imbalance as a result of the scale and  the speed of the army build up.’ 	
Hitler had come to power as  German Chancellor on a platform of ‘restoring the prestige of Germany’,  so in that sense his emphasis on rearmament was understandable to German  citizens. ‘What the Nazis seemed to be about,’ says Professor Sir Ian  Kershaw, ‘but also other groups – nationalists who supported them – was  actually attaining the territory back which they had lost through the  Versailles Treaty, through restoring Germany’s boundaries, acquiring  that land back again. And, hence, in the 1930s all sorts of people from  the outside, including Neville Chamberlain and the government in this  country and in France, they regarded Hitler as an extreme nationalist  who wanted now to restore German pride and German territory, of course,  and acquire back the land which had been lost at Versailles.’ 	
But,  as Kershaw says, Hitler always wanted ‘more’ than this. He had written  in ‘Mein Kampf’ [my struggle] back in the early 1920s, that Germany  should turn ‘East’ to the Soviet Union and try and make a new Empire  there, and he stayed true to this aim – but in the 1930s he was careful  never to express this desire explicitly in the open. Instead, Foreign  Policy triumph seemed to follow Foreign Policy triumph, with the  reoccupation of the Ruhr (1936), the Anschluss with Austria (1938), and  the Munich conference and the occupation of the Sudetenland. And all of  this was gained without war. 
‘People loved Hitler,’ says the  German historian, Professor Norbert Frei.  ‘Most of the Germans loved  Hitler at that stage, not because he intended to go to war but just  because he achieved all these things without going to war. Not only in  terms of economic achievements and overcoming the mass unemployment, but  also when it came to the revision of the Versailles Treaty and all the  things that were related to it. The Germans at that time were even  talking about Hitler as 'General Bloodless', a military person who was  able to achieve all these things without spilling blood.’ 	
‘However,’  says Ian Kershaw, ‘that image was destroyed when the Germans entered  Prague in March 1939 and now for the first time are acquiring land which  had not been taken away from them at Versailles, it was not part of an  earlier Germany and nation state. The majority of the people who had now  been taken over were not ethnic Germans at all but they were Czechs.  And so to this extent, now, the march into Prague was the instant where  it became recognizable that Hitler was not interested just in a greater  Germany of ethnic Germans, but his ambitions were imperialist ones which  stretched who knows where?’ 	
And in pursuit of Hitler’s  imperialist ambitions, it was also clear that the Jewish population of  Europe had a great deal to fear at the hands of the Nazis and Adolf  Hitler. Not only had the Nazis persecuted German Jews since 1933 to the  extent that half of all German Jews had fled the country before the  outbreak of war, but in a speech in the Reichstag in January Hitler had  made an extraordinary ‘prophecy’. 
‘He makes this two hour  speech,’ says Professor Christopher Browning, ‘in the middle of which he  has two paragraphs devoted to the Jews. He decries the Western powers  for not taking them off Germany’s hands, because of course there are  emigration barriers against Jews getting into other countries. He also  says that Germans are happy to let them go but other countries are not  taking them by 1938. Then the second paragraph is the one that has the  so called ‘prophecy’; that if the world Jewish conspiracy plunges  Germany into another world war, it will not mean the destruction of  Germany but the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe. The question  then is whether this is to be read again through the hindsight of  Auschwitz, or if it this to be understood by looking at what actually  happens in the next two years. What does this speech trigger.... 
'In  my opinion what Hitler is doing is sending the message, and he does  this often through prophecies or exhortations, to all of his followers,  he knowing in fact that the world war he is referring to he is going to  precipitate, that from now on the Jewish question is a European-wide  question, not just a German question, and just as they solved the Jewish  question in Germany or tried to, by removal of the Jews altogether, now  you’re going to have to get them all out of Europe, and the destruction  of the Jewish race in Europe means that there will be no more Jews  there.’
‘I think Hitler had a murderous personality,’ says  Professor David Cesarani, ‘in the sense that he had no conception of the  value of human life. It’s hard to say why not, but he could order  individuals and groups to be slaughtered without any compunction at all,  he simply did not feel any compassion for most human beings. In that  sense I think that when he talked about murdering Jews, destroying the  Jews, a part of him fantasised about their biological eradication and  their murder…. [but] if all of the Jews had emigrated from Germany  before 1939; if it had been possible to deport Jews from the German  spheres of influence - the territories that they conquered - to  Madagascar or Siberia, I think that probably would have sufficed for  Hitler… I think that Hitler always wanted to break the power of the Jews  and this could be achieved practically and also symbolically in various  ways, like removing Jews from economic, political, social and cultural  influence, by segregating them territorially, by forcing them onto a  reservation for example, or finding some corner of the German sphere of  influence where they could be relocated, and if they lived or died it  didn’t really matter but their power would be broken.’ 	
And on  the Jewish question - as on the decision to wage war in the first place -  the role of Hitler is key. According to Richard Evans, Regius professor  of history at Cambridge University, ‘Hitler’s beliefs are absolutely  paramount as a causal factor in the Second World War…We know now through  documentation that has become available over the last few years that he  intended there to be a general European war absolutely from the outset;  he’s telling people in private in 1932 and 1933, when he’s coming to  power, that he’s going to have a general war.’ 	
And perhaps even  more extraordinary than that conclusion, is the fact that Hitler  entered the Second World War in 1939 with little idea how he was going  to win it. Indeed, in a quite fundamental way he was about to fight the  ‘wrong’ war according to his own ideological beliefs, for in August 1939  he signed a non-Aggression pact with his ideological enemy, the Soviet  Union, and knew he shortly risked war with the one European power who he  had previously wanted to embrace – Great Britain. 	
Moreover,  Hitler also knew that this was a war that Germany might lose. But still,  says Professor Adam Tooze says, he precipitates the conflict because  ‘he thinks the alternatives are worse. Because he’s fundamentally  convinced, in my view, that the world Jewish conspiracy has taken on a  whole new ominous character. This starts in the summer of 1938 with the  Evian Conference in which America becomes involved in European affairs  around the issue of the organised emigration of Eastern European Jews.  And this is triggered, of course, by the incredible violence that the  Germans unleash in Austria after the Anschluss. And this, in Hitler’s  mind, shifts the focus of the world Jewish conspiracy, which in his view  is Germany's ultimate enemy, from Moscow which has previously been  aligned with Communism, to a very clear statement by early 1939 that the  real centre of the world Jewish conspiracy is Washington, Wall Street  and Hollywood. That, of course, fundamentally shifts your assessment of  the strategic picture because behind Britain and France, as in World War  One, ultimately stands the full force of the American armaments  economy….And so with that in mind, the balance of force in Europe in  1939 looks extremely ominous because British rearmament is beginning  with real intensity from the beginning of 1939. The Germans understand  this, and so even though the situation is bad in the autumn of 1939 they  quite rightly predict that it’ll become worse in 1940-42 and this is  because they’ve come face to face, for the third time, with the  limitations of their own economy. So after attempting in 1938 to achieve  a huge spurt in armaments production in conjunction with the Munich  crisis, they find themselves having to dial back in early 1939 precisely  at the moment that international tension is really boiling to a head.  And it’s in that conjuncture that Hitler, I think, decides on a leap  into the future by means of an unleashing of a war.’